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Abstract
Developing and delivering infrastructure capable of supporting long-term manned operations
to the lunar surface has been a primary objective of the NASA Constellation Program. Several
concepts have been developed related to development and deployment of lunar exploration systems
that provide critical functionality such as transportation, habitation, and communication, to name
a few. Together, these systems perform complex safety-critical functions, largely dependent on
avionics for control and behavior of system functions. These functions are implemented using in-
terchangeable, modular avionics designed for lunar transit and lunar surface deployment. There are
two core concepts in this reference avionics architecture. The first concept uses distributed, smart
systems to manage complexity, simplify integration, and facilitate commonality. The second core
concept is to employ extensive commonality between elements and subsystems. These two concepts
are used in the context of developing reference designs for many lunar surface exploration vehicles
and elements. These concepts are repeated as architectural patterns in a conceptual architectural
framework. This report describes the use of these architectural patterns in a reference avionics
architecture for Lunar surface exploration systems.
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1 Introduction
Developing and delivering infrastructure capable of supporting long-term manned operations to
the lunar surface has been a primary objective of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Constellation Program in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. Several concepts
have been developed related to establishing an architecture of exploration vehicles and assets to
support this goal [Kennedy et al., 2010]. In each of these concepts, there are a number of key
systems (or elements) that provide critical functionality such as transportation, habitation, and
communication, to name a few. Together, these systems and elements perform complex safety-
critical functions, largely dependent on avionics for the control and behavior of system functions.
The following sections describe the computing and data architecture that has been assumed in
developing reference element designs for various analyses.
The term “element” keeps with the general Lunar Surface Systems (LSS) project nomenclature
and refers to things that would typically be called a vehicle such as a lander or a rover. It also
refers to items such as habitation elements and in-situ resource utilization elements, but the general
concept is that an element is a discrete system of systems enabling a defined function.
Throughout this report, various figures are used to illustrate the topic at hand. The majority
of the figures are depicted using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) notation [SysML v1.1].
The diagrams are from a SysML model developed for Lunar Surface Systems, but are occasionally
simplified with components elided for clarity. The diagrams for the reference systems listed in
Section 4 are more complete.
The organization of the remainder of the document is as follows. Section 2 presents a general
overview of the surface architecture. Section 3 describes the basic avionics architecture applied
to each of the elements. Section 4 presents overview descriptions of reference designs for select
surface elements. This report concludes in Section 5 with a brief summary, some considerations for
destinations other than the lunar surface, and potential future work.
2 Surface Architecture
The lunar surface architecture is comprised of multiple cooperative systems (or elements) used
for surface habitation and exploration. The aggregation of, and the interactions between, these
various elements is generically referred to as the surface architecture (including interactions with
other Constellation systems). The primary elements considered in developing the surface archi-
tecture support transportation, habitation, mobility, power, and communications. Each of these
elements are required to provide, to varying degrees, control functions such as maintaining thermal
control, navigation, and Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS). These control functions
are managed (controlled and monitored) through Command and Data Handling (C&DH) systems.
The buildup of the surface architecture is performed over several years of discrete missions.
The elements are delivered to the lunar surface using lunar lander vehicles (landers). Once on the
surface, the crew lives in various elements supporting habitation. Depending on the length of the
mission this may be the lander itself, the Lunar Electric Rover (LER) [Harrison et al., 2008], or a
habitation element [Kennedy et al., 2010]. Various notional elements have been conceived to provide
surface mobility for crew and assets. These include unpressurized rovers, the LER (a pressurized
rover), and the All Terrain Hex-Legged Extra-Terrestrial Explorer (ATHLETE) [Wilcox, 2008,
2009; Townsend et al., 2010]. The ATHLETE is used to transport large cargo while the rovers
transport crew and smaller assets.
Communication between the various elements is supported by peer-to-peer communication over
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a wireless mesh-network. Communication terminals provide wireless network connectivity and rout-
ing functions for surface elements; however, each element is capable of communicating directly with
other elements. Together, the surface elements, including the communication terminals and landers,
comprise the lunar surface wireless network. Communications can also be relayed through orbiting
lunar communications satellites or via earth-based systems extending the range of communications
beyond the lunar horizon.
3 Common Avionics Architecture Framework
The avionics provide the command and data handling (processing and storage); element au-
tomation; network connectivity and routing for surface elements; and Integrated Systems Health
Management (ISHM). These functions are provided by systems of interchangeable, modular avion-
ics designed for lunar transit and lunar surface deployment. Systems are optimized towards reuse
and commonality of form and interface and can be configured via software or component integra-
tion for special purpose applications (i.e. card modules used for different applications in different
chassis configuration loads).
The avionics systems for the various surface elements are envisioned to be designed around a
common architectural framework. These systems are fundamentally computer controlled digital
systems comprised of electronic assemblies with behaviors defined through software applications.
A collection of assemblies are interconnected for communications and systems control. The systems
and assemblies must be maintainable and reconfigurable to accommodate multiple applications in
an evolving surface architecture. To facilitate this, the electronic systems are modular and employ
a standard, stackable form-factor. C&DH systems are distributed throughout a host element and
are largely comprised of computing elements, data bus networks, sensors, and actuators. The main
components for computing systems include computers, network interface cards, mass storage, data
acquisition units, and output drivers (i.e. remote I/O). These establish a foundation for a product-
line approach to developing an architectural framework for the various surface elements. The
following sections describe the characteristics and aggregation of components to realize subsystems
hosted in the various surface elements.
The basic high-level architecture is depicted in Figure 3-1 in a Block Definition Diagram (BDD).
The BDD is the primary diagram in SysML used to depict the structure or composition of a
system. The diamond-headed arrows indicate a piece-part relationship between the element and
its subsystems. In this BDD, the generic element is comprised of one or more bus interface units
(Section 3.1.2), a common services assembly (Section 3.1.3), some number of network switches
(Section 3.1.4), and a backup computer (Section 3.2.2). The Bus Interface Units (BIUs) provide
for the distribution of interfaces to sensors and actuators. The Common Services Assembly (CSA)
provides core computing and communications functions such as primary computers and network
routing functions (refer to Section 3.1.3). The network switch may be embedded in the CSA
or separately integrated with the host element, depending on element constraints. The backup
computer provides dissimilar redundancy for critical software functions and performs safety and
health assessment for the element. As illustrated later, various elements can realize alternate
configurations using the same basic conceptual components.
There are two core concepts in the reference avionics architecture described in this report. The
first concept uses distributed, smart systems to manage complexity, simplify integration, and facil-
itate commonality. This trend is on-going in commercial and safety-critical applications where we
imbue systems and components which were previously simple electrical or even mechanical compo-
nents with computational capabilities [Hammett, 2002]. While this increases the complexity of the
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Figure 3-1. Block definition diagram of the basic computing architecture.
subsystems or component, these “smart” subsystems and components are easier to develop, inte-
grate, use, and maintain. This is because we can partition and modularize behavior and interfaces
for hardware and software systems to establish a collection of configurable, modular components
that are reusable in multiple applications. This leads to the second core concept which is to em-
ploy extensive commonality between elements and subsystems. The concept of Common Avionics
and Software (CAS) has developed to refer to a collection of modules that are applied to various
elements and systems. This increases experience with fielded systems and reduces low-level devel-
opment. It also simplifies reuse and maintenance activities. These two concepts are used in the
context of developing reference designs for many lunar surface exploration vehicles and elements.
These concepts appear constantly as architectural patterns repeated throughout this conceptual
architectural framework. The following sections describe the use of these architectural patterns in
the context of the reference avionics architecture for the LSS Project.
3.1 Computing and Data Assemblies
The primary components of the avionics systems are the computers and data systems. These
are fundamental to command and data handling systems used to manage element subsystems. The
computers are assumed to be high-reliability assemblies suitable for safety-critical applications. The
computing system is developed around a distributed architecture. This reduces performance re-
quirements for the control computers as well as potentially reducing power and integration complex-
ity. Command and control are coordinated through a collection of primary computers establishing
a locus of control. High-level control of the system is managed in the primary computers through
goal-oriented control laws. Low-level control and application specific interfaces are distributed away
from the primary computers, close to the controlled end-item (i.e. a sensor or actuator). As an ex-
ample, the primary computers would support an application to manage temperature and airflow for
ECLS in a habitation element. These commands would be sent to a controller in the air circulation
unit where the local controller would accordingly adjust pulse width modulation signals to effect
changes in fan speeds. It is also possible (for maintenance reasons among others) to “tunnel” to the
low-level controller and execute precise commands; however, this is not required during nominal
operations. In this way, the application (i.e. control law) can be abstracted from, although loosely
coupled with, the underlying hardware. This is expected to simplify certification and integration
costs as well as reduce hardware dependencies.
The computers are classified in three levels of performance: embedded controller, general pur-
pose computer, and application specific computer. Collectively, these are referred to as Operations
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Computers (OCs), OC-1, OC-2, and OC-3, respectively. Embedded controllers (OC-1) are low-level
controllers, or possibly even state machines hosted in an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),
and they serve a specific set of functions. General Purpose Computers (GPCs) are class 2 OCs, or
OC-2, and are more capable in terms of computing performance, comparable to traditional flight
computers. Application specific computers (OC-3), like the embedded controllers, are intended
for limited or specialized applications that require greater performance than efficiently realized
using GPCs. Application specific computers can be realized using custom integrated circuits (i.e.
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)) or using high-performance FPGA devices, with
the current trend favoring the latter. There is also the potential for multi-core and many-core
technology to further blend the boundaries between these definitions. Because these multi- and
many-core technologies are still fairly immature, they are not discussed here, so this report can
focus on architecture and not on technology.
The OC-2 could be asserted as the primary computing resources among the OCs; however, all
of the OCs are distributed throughout, and embedded within, the elements. The OC-2 is assumed
to be capable of several hundred Million Instructions Per Second (MIPS) and consume less than
10W at 28Vdc. This includes a single board computer, network interface, and a power supply. It
hosts a layered software architecture including a partitioned operating system, similar to ARINC-
653, providing application partitioning and software modularity. Applications include thermal
management, communications, vehicle navigation and guidance, and network services. One noted
application is network file services supporting network attached storage.
The OC-3 is applied to more intensive computing. It is assumed that these utilize reconfig-
urable computing (such as FPGAs) for computationally intensive applications. Example applica-
tions include video and imagery processing, synthetic illumination, relative navigation, and sensor
processing [Somervill, 2008]. These are assumed to be capable of the equivalent of 1000’s of MIPS
in processing for 15-25W at 28Vdc.
3.1.1 Form Factor
The various electronics assemblies adhere to a common, stackable form-factor. This assumption
is driven by attempts to reduce mass and is supported by multiple NASA studies (Constellation
Program Software and Avionics Integration Office (SAvIO) IDAC-4B Form-Factor Study and Lunar
Architecture Team phase 2 studies). It must be acknowledged that considerations for serviceability
have not been adequately addressed, but the primary metrics are related to reliability and mainte-
nance. We have assumed that external assemblies are retrieved and replaced via Extra-Vehicular
Activity (EVA) and that this would be on rare occasions. Assemblies serviced during EVA are
maintained by box-level replacement for an Operational Replacement Unit (ORU) and lower level
access (e.g. to replace modules in an assembly) is performed inside a pressurized environment.
Studies to assess the ramifications of crew time related to the maintenance of stackable assemblies
could indicate that the serviceability of card-in-backplane approaches outweighs the mass reduction
of stackable assemblies, but that information is not available at the time of this writing.
Figure 3-2 shows one depiction of a stackable form-factor. Existing form-factors include PC/104
and mezzanine form-factors. Companies have developed space-qualified products based on the
PC/104 form-factor; however, thermal management is an additional consideration as the commer-
cial PC/104 specification does not account for conduction cooling. NASA and the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) have invested in developing space qualified stackable
form-factors [Hodson, 2006; Seagrave, 2008; Cancro et al., 2009] but these are not standard. There
are many other vendors developing stackable solutions for spaceborne computing, any of which
could provide an opportunity to develop a standard suitable for lunar surface applications.
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Figure 3-2. Illustration of a conceptual stackable form-factor.
3.1.2 Bus Interface Units
The BIUs are modular, network attached controllers which interface with subsystem specific
functions. The BIUs provide the capability to distribute sensor and actuator interfaces in turn
reducing cable harness mass by placing the digital-to-analog interface as close to the end-item as
practicable. In this context, the BIU is analogous to shuttle Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs)
or Orion power and data units [Anderson, 2010, pg. 11]. A similar concept, referred to as Remote
Multplexor (RMUX) is employed in the conceptual lander design. The nomenclature “bus interface
unit” is continued from the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) smartbuyer study and is used here to
clarify the distinction between the LSS reference concepts and heritage designs. Subsequent studies
may result in migration towards an alternate or heritage design; however, our intent is to document
the functions and current estimates for various characteristics of the BIU1.
The primary purpose of the BIU is to facilitate communications with sensors, actuators, and
subordinate systems. A typical BIU is illustrated in Figure 3-3 in the context of a host system.
The element includes a control computer and an element BIU. The triangle-headed arrow from
the control computer to the operations computer indicates a “specialization” relationship in that
the control computer is a type of operations computer. The main constituents of a BIU are
the controller, network interface, and subsystem control cards. In the figure, the controller is
referred to as an embedded processor with the network interface embedded as part of the controller.
The controller serves to validate commands from controlling computers and return telemetry from
associated subsystems (i.e. aggregate distributed sensor and analog inputs). The BIU performs
integrity assurance functions (such as voting or validation) for effectors ensuring a high-integrity
communications path from the primary control system to the end-item actuator. The subsystem
control cards are dedicated to various subsystems such as ECLS, power, and thermal management.
An alternative segregation of interfaces could have been by interface type; however, it is believed
(supported by studies performed by Orion and Altair2) that cards dedicated to subsystems enable
greater optimization, decoupling between subsystems for power control and fault containment, and
1Arguably, this caveat applies to all of the systems and assemblies discussed throughout this report.
2The Orion and Altair studies have not been published.
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Figure 3-3. Generic vehicle Block Definition Diagram depicting BIUs
simplified integration, among other reasons [Anderson, 2010, pg. 11].
The system configuration is further illustrated in Figure 3-4 as an Internal Block Diagram (IBD).
The IBD, as the name implies, depicts the internal connections of the respective system. In this
figure, the control application is distributed between the control computer and the embedded
processor in the BIU. High-level control is managed in the control computer which sends commands
to the BIU processor over the network data bus. Status and telemetry are returned by the BIU
controller to the control computer (typically part of the CSA in the host element) if required or
requested.
Considering the BIU concept is intended to reduce wire mass, a few alternative concepts for wire
harness reduction are also briefly discussed here. The first is that the BIU could be a wireless node,
utilizing only a power connection, eliminating the data cable harness from the switch to the BIU
which is estimated to be up to 10 kg per BIU. The BIU would connect to the network using the local
wireless network (e.g. 802.11) using protocols to ensure the integrity of communications. Another
alternative uses data over the power bus similar to that used in commercial home automation and
control. The data rates available over a power bus are expected to be less than 1 Mbit/s which
is likely sufficient for most BIU applications. Communications over DC power is currently being
developed for industrial applications and while the concept is novel, its implications and challenges
in manned space applications have not been thoroughly evaluated.
3.1.3 Common Services Assembly
The Common Services Assembly (CSA) is a concept leveraged from the development of the
Altair lunar lander. Originally, the CSA was conceived as the primary computing assets for the
lander accommodating both manned (i.e. with an ascent module) and unmanned (i.e. in a cargo
configuration) missions. During its development, the CSA has evolved from a monolithic assembly
to an aggregation of assemblies that collectively realize the core functions common to each of the
various missions. This concept is used in major surface elements such as the Power and Support
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Figure 3-4. Internal block diagram depicting the interfaces between the control computer and the
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Figure 3-5. BDD for a typical Common Services Assembly.
Unit (PSU), Pressurized Core Module (PCM), or LER where the CSA is a common collection of
electronics assemblies that are integrated into the element to provide core computing and control
functions. The key functions of the CSA include primary computing, video processing, network
and data routing, communications, thermal management, and power distribution. These functions
are largely represented in the BDD in Figure 3-5. Those functions not shown are either realized via
software applications or embedded as a subsystem function in the CSA BIU. For example, thermal
management of the CSA is embedded in the CSA BIU as a subsystem control card as described in
Section 3.1.2.
The IBD in Figure 3-6 depicts the internal connections of the CSA. The Command, Con-
trol, Communications, and Information (C3I) routers connect the assemblies of the CSA with the
host element’s local network and local communication systems. The local network traffic is routed
through the router switches either to the computers or out the Wide Area Network (WAN) inter-
face to the Surface Wireless Network (SWN). Power is supplied to the CSA via the CSA Power
Distribution Unit (PDU) which could be integrated into the BIU or kept separate. The computers
are synchronized and perform voting over the local network. An alternative configuration could
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Figure 3-6. Internal block diagram for a typical Common Services Assembly.
be to implement a dedicated Cross-Channel Data Link (CCDL) between each of the processors.
This alternative constrains the proximity of the CSA computers at the expense of harness mass.
Assuming the local network can support fault-tolerant synchronization and agreement protocols
(discussed further in Section 3.2.3), a dedicated bus is not required and using the local network
allows for greater flexibility in system integration and communications.
The Video Processing Unit (VPU) is a network attached processor for Compressor-Decompressor
(CODEC) processing of motion imagery. The VPU provides the ability to route and manage video
streams from multiple sources to multiple destinations. Video received by the VPU can be merged
with other video streams for viewing locally or remotely. The VPU can route motion imagery
(merged or single channel streams) over dedicated links to crew terminals for real-time applica-
tions within the local host element. Otherwise, video is compressed and distributed over the local
network using internet protocols for routing and distribution. It is assumed that the motion im-
agery is compressed in the H.264 format and distributed using something similar to the Real-Time
Protocol (RTP) [Schulzrinne et al., 2003]. The VPU is described further in Section 3.3.4.
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3.1.4 Onboard Data Networks
The elements host multiple data buses. The primary data bus for the surface elements is Gigabit
Ethernet (GbE) and studies have included the use of Time-triggered Gigabit Ethernet (TT-GbE)
which is discussed with fault-management in Section 3.2. Gigabit Ethernet is the specified data
connection between Constellation Program vehicles; however, it has been employed internal to
the lunar surface vehicles to facilitate high data rates for video and communications, as well as to
accommodate science payloads and simplify integration. Internal to the elements, the GbE network
is a mixed-criticality network hosting both critical and non-critical traffic. Critical traffic supporting
fault-tolerant communications and element management is managed using time triggered protocols
while non-critical, random data and high-bandwidth traffic (e.g. noncritical video) is handled as
best-effort Ethernet traffic . The operation of these two traffic classes is transparent and assumed to
be possible using TT-GbE to assure quality of service (QoS) and timing properties [AS6802 Draft];
however, other variants and protocols have the potential to meet the real-time quality of service
requirements for the various elements [Rushby, 2003; Gwaltney and Briscoe, 2006]. More recent
examples include FlexRay [FlexRay v2.1], and possibly even SpaceWire. This reference avionics
architecture assumes that the primary onboard data network is TT-GbE and for the remainder of
this report the term TT-GbE is used interchangeably with GbE.
Noting that many elements and subsystems may not require the bandwidth, or overhead of a
GbE network, auxiliary serial data buses are also utilized. Examples are SpaceWire on the higher
performance end of the spectrum or the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus at the lower perfor-
mance end. These are used for close proximity (a few meters) low data rate connections, peripheral
devices, and simple controllers. Example applications include interfaces to input controllers and
subsystem interfaces such as those between a PDU and a BIU.
Considering the number of sensor and control interfaces distributed within each element and
the size of some elements, such as habitation systems (e.g. core habitat, pressurized logistics
modules, or pressurized crew cabin), there is an option to distribute the switch function across
multiple, redundant switches. This reduces the length of cable runs to the network switches enabling
subsystems and components to connect to the nearest switches. This configuration is shown in
Figure 3-7 with four TT-GbE switches. Each of the switches is in turn connected to two other
switches increasing network connectivity as well as resilience to switch failures. Another benefit
of this distribution is that it reduces the thermal footprint of the required switching components
by distributing the power load around the element. The fundamental principle here is that there
are redundant paths between critical components. In this example, the CSA (see Section 3.1.3)
hosts the primary computers and has redundant paths to the backup computer as well as the BIU
controllers.
3.2 Redundancy and Fault Management
There are truly many considerations that come into play when considering system redundancy
and fault management. During the development of the architectural concepts for LSS, a few key
assumptions have been adopted. First the systems are at a minimum single-fault tolerant (1-
FT) with the first fault fail-operational (i.e. no degradation in performance due to the failure).
Ideally, the architecture realizes the property of composability such that when multiple elements are
integrated or mated there is an increase in the fault-tolerance of the aggregate system. For example,
mating two 1-FT habitation elements yields a 2-FT configuration. While this may seem to be a
straight forward assumption, such configurations are non-trivial to implement and certify [Butler,
2008]. Another assumption is that the architecture can be realized using industry standard form-
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Figure 3-7. Simple network with distributed switches.
factors and components. FlexRay would be an example of this3 [FlexRay v2.1]; it is also an example
of using commercial vendor products. The final assumption is that the architecture will utilize a
mixed criticality network. It is debatable as to whether this is the lower mass configuration, but
intuitively, that conclusion seems reasonable4. This concept aligns with Air Force Research Lab
development of a mixed criticality network for defense applications to enable quick integration and
deployment as well as reduce system mass and power [MCAR]. When the various element designs
realize a greater fidelity, this assumption can (and assuredly will) enjoy a thorough vetting.
3.2.1 Primary Computer System
The primary computing functions are realized in a complex of OC-2 class computers using an
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) architecture [Watkins and Walter, 2007]. These could be stan-
dard single board computers (uni-processor or multi-core processors if the products are available)
or Self-Checking Pairs (SCPs) similar to those used in the CEV Orion [McCabe et al., 2009]. The
current architecture concepts assume the basic assembly is not an SCP, but a standard processor
board that would be available as a standard product with comparable alternatives available from
multiple vendors. The primary considerations in the selection of this processor configuration are
application synchronization, power consumption, and product availability. Early concepts assumed
SCPs due to the presumed ease of use; however, due to the expense in power and the limited vendor
selection, the uni-processor is assumed. While SCPs do mask random hardware failures; they do
not alleviate the need for inter-processor communication for state synchronization and agreement
protocols. It is expected that either configuration will require significant software investment that
can then be leveraged across the entire surface architecture. It is recommended that a detailed
cost assessment including software, system reliability, and life-cycle costs drive the final selection
as most of the architectural concepts discussed here are generic enough to accommodate either
uni-processors or self-checking computers.
3TT-GbE may also be an example, when the standard is complete.
4An alternate approach is to utilized highly optimized, dedicated data buses for the various applications and
subsystems. For example, a discrete network for video distribution and another for subsystems control separate from
crew and science data networks.
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Table 3-1. Property estimates for the primary and backup computers.
Mass Power Estimate
Assembly Estimate (Nominal / Max)
Primary Computer Unit (OC-2) 3 kg 6 W / 10 W
MFBC 3 kg 3 W / 7 W
MFBC (w/ router and storage) 5 kg 9 W / 17 W
The primary computers operate in a time-synchronous fashion. Consistent state across the
primary computers is managed through agreement protocols to ensure safe operation as well as
detect and isolate faulty computers [Harper and Lala, 1991; Harper et al., 1988]. The voting
protocols are routed over the local network. As noted above, the primary computers could utilize
a dedicated CCDL; however, it is expected that a dedicated CCDL is not required. The driver
for the multiplicity of computers is fault-protection from random failures, but also environmentally
induced errors such as memory or processor upset. For critical operations or during periods of
environmental events (solar particle events), the processors operate collectively to ensure the safety
of crew and assets. However, considering that the time-to-criticality is fairly long during nominal
operation of habitation elements and surface rovers, as compared to flight vehicles, systems could
potentially run a single space-qualified computer monitored by the backup computer (described
in the following section). This would allow for either reduced power profile or excess processing
bandwidth for additional (non-critical) applications when the environment is less active. Issues
of certifying the multiple configurations required to host alternate applications are complex and
important, but are not germane to this discussion and not addressed here.
3.2.2 Backup Computer System
There are a number of reasons for including a backup system including common mode failures,
fault-tolerance, and power modes. In the proposed architecture, a Minimum Function Backup
Computer (MFBC) is added to the network as shown in Figure 3-7. This is a dissimilar, potentially
lower performance, computing system responsible for tracking the operations and commands from
the CSA as well as maintaining the habitation system through quiescent periods. The MFBC is
connected to both TT-GbE channels where either channel can be powered down to reduce power
utilization. It will utilize the TT-GbE network for time synchronization and potentially operates as
a Time-Triggered entity. Alternatively, the MFBC can participate in synchronization protocols with
the CSA computers across the C3I routers. The backup computer has an integrated router function
such that it does not require the CSA to manage the element resources. This is to accommodate
low power modes when the CSA is quiescent or during emergency situations such as partial network
failure.
Table 3-1 lists the basic mass and power estimates for the primary and backup computer systems.
These values represent current best estimates without margin for any uncertainty in the design.
The listing for the primary computer is for a single unit which includes (in this estimate) a single
board computer, a network interface and redundant power supplies. The network interface provides
connections to redundant networks. The MFBC is a lower performance computer compared to the
primary computer, but is envisioned to include greater functionality including a router and data
storage to reduce reliance on other systems and mitigate CSA failure.
11
Command propagation Command propagation[Interaction] sd [   ]
«block»
mfbc : Backup Computer
«block»
es-2a : Element Switch
«block»
es-1a : Element Switch
«block»
biu : Element BIU
«block»
csa : CSA
[Valid commands]
[else]
alt
Evaluate data5: 
Evaluate OC commands9: 
Issue MFBC commands8: 
Notify error15: 
Forward data2: 
Forward data3: 
Forward command12: 
Forward MFBC commands10: 
Forward data4: 
Forward OC commands7: 
11: 
Forward notice16: 
Publish data1: 
Execute OC Commands13: 
Execute MFBC commands14: 
Issue OC commands6: 
Figure 3-8. Sequence diagram of command propagation and validation.
3.2.3 Data Integrity
The computing elements in the CSA perform an agreement protocol internal to the CSA.
Messages are agreed upon and signed prior to distribution to network elements. The signed messages
are sent by each processor through both channels with the end-point ultimately receiving at least
six command copies . The end-effectors, for example, then have potentially three discrete messages
(in duplicate though). The effectors then respond to the first valid pair of commands in agreement
and from discrete sources.
The process is illustrated in Figure 3-8. In this example, a BIU is publishing data regarding one
or more subsystems. This data is forwarded to the backup computer and to the CSA via the second
network switch (es-1a in the figure) in the path. Both the backup computer and the CSA OCs
evaluate the data and generate commands. The CSA issues commands to the BIU via intermediate
network switches in the element. These commands are also received by the backup computer which
evaluates the commands to assess correct operation. The MFBC may then issue commands that
are also forwarded to the BIU for execution. The BIU then receives duplicate commands from the
MFBC and each of the OCs in the CSA from which the BIU selects which commands to execute.
The BIU will execute the first pair of commands from separate OCs in the CSA that match. If no
agreement is determined between the CSA OCs, the backup computer will be included to select a
matching pair of commands. In the event that no two computers agree, the commands from the
backup computer are selected for execution.
Figure 3-9 illustrates the current assumption using non-voting network interface between the
12
Validating System Validating System[Block] ibd [   ]
nif : Network 
Interface
nic : GbE
mbuf : Message 
Buffer [2..*]
vl : Validation Logic
ni : Message Validation Interface
ni_a : GbE
eff : Effector
Validated Command
Signed Message
Signed Message
Figure 3-9. Validating network interface.
computing systems and the end-effector. This option receives and validates incoming commands
for protocol compliance and valid messages are queued to the buffers. The buffered messages are
then compared and only the validated, matching commands from discrete sources are forwarded to
the effector. This can be implemented as either self-checking paths using an X-Y lane approach or
a single interface from the network interface to the effector, depending on criticality and reliability
requirements. This architecture has the benefit of a common interface that is independent of
the function of the effector. It does, however, rely on signed and validated messages to ensure
integrity and authenticity of messages and origins. This is similar to that described by Hanaway
and Moorehead [1989] for the Orbiter main engine throttle controller.
In Figure 3-9, a single interface is shown between the validation logic and the effector. Depending
on the application, there may be a need to continue redundant paths to the effector. The compare
logic would serve to simplify the validation required by the effector. The effector would only
respond to commands received from both links from the compare logic, but would not have to
validate message signature.
The process of message validation is shown in Figure 3-10. The process is initiated by signals
that a message has been received from either a primary computer in the CSA or the backup
computer. The messages are buffered for validation which checks for correct signatures and errors
in the packet. When sufficient valid message have been received, the valid message is issued for
execution. In the event that none of the primary messages can be validated, the backup computer
message is issued. Otherwise, an error is reported to the backup computer.
Figure 3-11 illustrates an alternative network interface that requires voting logic either between
the network interface and the end effector (as shown) or embedded in the effector. The architecture
also has a common network interface which is potentially simpler than that shown in Figure 3-9 and
does not rely on message signing protocols. The additional voting logic is unique to the individual
end-effector and requires two matching commands or three messages that can be averaged. The
activities performed in the voting process are shown in Figure 3-12.
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3.2.4 Clock Synchronization
Clock synchronization is fundamental to distributed, real-time applications such as those used
in safety-critical systems [Cristian and Fetzer, 1995; Kopetz et al., 2004]. The computer clock
synchronization can be performed using a data network in the CSA or provided by the TT-GbE
network. In the former, the architecture is similar to a CCDL architecture for synchronization with
the processors accessing separate channels for sensors and effectors. In the latter, network timing
is provided by the TT-GbE network with the clock domain extended to incorporate the CSA.
For the option where clock synchronization is local to the computing elements, the computers
perform clock synchronization and data agreement protocols over a network local to the CSA. In
this configuration, the timing of the operation of the element systems is managed as software sched-
uled Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) in a master/slave configuration from the perspective
of control systems. Timing is managed by the computing complex and commands are executed
according to the time schedule within the CSA computers. Commands are issued to subsystems
which respond in an event driven process. The TT-GbE switches forward data packets as either
Rate Constrained (RC) or Best Effort (BE) traffic. For the discussion of control architecture, crit-
ical data is routed as RC traffic with guaranteed bandwidth and bounded latency. This is similar
to a CCDL approach using switches for the channels and cross-strapping between the channels.
In the option with the TT-GbE timing extended to the computing elements in the CSA, the
timing is provided by the TT-GbE network and resolved across the entire network [AS6802 Draft].
This however carries the potential issue of compatibility between the TT-GbE network and the CSA
implementation. In this configuration, critical traffic is also routed using the Time-triggered (TT)
traffic class. System operation is managed using a global schedule with network events (commands
and responses) occurring as TT events.
There is also the option for a loose coupling between the two time domains. This may introduce
additional latency for the synchronization across the boundary. It also adds the complexity of
managing which domain is the time master in a safe and robust manner. Paulitsch and Steiner
[2003] describe clock synchronization across a network of distributed clusters for fault-tolerant
applications.
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3.3 Data Management
A primary function of the computer network within and between surface elements is the man-
agement of data, including collection, storage, and distribution. Each of the large elements provides
Network Attached Storage (NAS) services to other elements and crew.
3.3.1 Publish and Subscribe Services
Telemetry streams are broadcast to the network as services such that other elements may sub-
scribe to the service to receive status and monitor the remote system. This process of broadcasting
data streams is referred to as publishing data. One possible way to realize this functionality is to use
Data Distribution Services (DDS) such as that described by Object Management Group (OMG)
standard [DDS v1.2]. This enables systems to configure access to data sources as the surface in-
frastructure evolves and to accommodate varying mission scenarios. Access to the published data
streams must be protected by security and authentication protocols.
3.3.2 Storage
As described above, large elements provide NAS services for other surface elements and redun-
dant storage where required. This supports audio, video, and imagery storage as well as software
application and science data storage. It is expected that this storage will be as large a practicable
for long-term exposure in the space radiation environment. Current estimates are several hundred
gigabytes (GB) to a few Terabytes (TB) in a single unit. Memory trends indicate an approximate
scaling factor of two every two years. Launched in 1994, Clementine had 2.1 Gbits of storage in its
solid state recorder [Garrett et al., 1995]. Applying the trend to estimate potential range of storage
size yields an estimate of 2020 - 1994 = 26 years or 15 steps5. Doubling memory density at each
of the 15 technology steps gives 215, or a factor of 32,768. Applying this factor to the 2.1 Gbits of
storage on Clementine yields an estimate of 2.1 TB. Using Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
as a reference point, the estimate is in the range of 800 GB to 1.6 TB so it seems credible that the
lunar surface architecture could have data storage units ranging from hundreds of GB to a few TB
to support surface operations.
3.3.3 Audio
The crew audio from headset microphones is digitized for local intercom distribution. Audio
is compressed for onboard recording and transmission to other elements. Transmission to exter-
nal elements can be enabled by push-to-talk switches whereas internal audio is enabled by voice
operated switches. To realize these functions, audio hardware samples and converts analog signals
to digital formats such as G.711 and G.729 for distribution over the network. The two primary
components are the Audio Interface Unit (AIU) and the Audio Converter Unit (ACU). The AIU
provides interfaces for hardline connections to audio communication hardware. Wireless systems
transmit digitally formatted audio data which is routed to the ACU for packet generation. An
example of this is shown below in Section 3.4.2 describing utility panels.
5The observant reader deduces that 26/2 6= 15. The 15 steps accounts for the time delay from part selection
during the design phase until the eventual launch. We’ve assumed a conservative four years from part selection to
launch.
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Table 3-2. Property estimates for the video processing unit.
Mass Power Estimate
Assembly Estimate (Nominal / Max)
Video Processing Unit 5 kg 16 W / 25 W
Video Processing Unit (optimized) 3 kg 6 W / 8 W
3.3.4 Video
The various video streams distributed throughout LSS drive a fair amount of complexity and
performance in the element data systems. As such, video becomes one of the key drivers for using a
high bandwidth network such as TT-GbE. The primary resource used to manage video is the VPU
which is also an example of an applied OC-3 processing system. The VPU receives uncompressed
video from cameras over High-Definition Motion Imagery (HDMI) interfaces and compresses the
video for distribution over the local network. The resulting video can be distributed in higher quality
for local use or lower quality if it has to be transmitted over Radio Frequency (RF) networks. The
primary subassemblies in the VPU are the controller board, network interface, encoder/decoder
processing boards, and a power converter. The controller and network interface may be integrated
as a single module. Estimates of characteristic properties are listed in Table 3-2. The first entry
assumes reconfigurable computing based on FPGAs to realize the video processing. The second
entry assumes an ASIC development specifically designed for the VPU to reduce power and mass.
Both reflect processing capacity for four concurrent video channels. Either can be extended by
adding additional video processor boards.
Uncompressed video may be distributed to displays internal to the host element if the application
requires. For example, critical applications may not be able to tolerate dropouts in motion imagery
packets resulting in a need for a dedicated video network between select assets . Once video streams
are processed by the VPU, they are distributed over the local network. The video stream is stored in
network attached storage which supports file streaming on request from any of the surface elements.
Video is stored until it is transmitted to ground for storage and distribution. Once the video has
been transmitted, it is deleted unless it has been marked to be saved.
3.4 Display and Control
Display and Control (D&C) systems are the primary systems for crew interactions with sur-
face elements, allowing the crew to monitor and control both local and remote assets deployed
throughout the lunar surface outpost. The D&C systems are comprised of a number of compo-
nents, collectively referred to as crew workstations which provide various functions and services.
The workstations are attached to the network and can access and display all stored data as well
as data streams published to the network. The primary service supported by the workstation is
command and control. They also support health and status services differentiating criticality and
notification of fault events. Also, the workstation supports the Caution and Warning (C&W) sys-
tem providing notification to the crew. The workstation display layout is managed via software
configuration to suit operational modes and user preferences. The display renders text and imagery
(still and motion). Data and telemetry formatting is managed partially through DDS services using
self-describing data and format schemas.
A standard D&C interface and subsystem has been conceived to support a number of different
LSS elements. This will provide a consistent interface for command and control and data presenta-
tion to the user simplifying training and operations and reducing risk of operator confusion. While
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Figure 3-13. Composition of the crew workstation.
there is an intention to develop and deploy a common D&C system across LSS and the lunar lander;
there are a number of considerations that must be addressed. Consideration must be given to form-
factor compatibility across all of the applications. There may also be dependencies on requirements
and software which are unique to the individual vehicles. The D&C systems are expected to be
used primarily in a pressurized environment; however, they must also accommodate gloved-hand
operation in both nominal and emergency activities in a vacuum environment. This indicates the
need to understand usability issues across all of the operational modes of the individual elements.
3.4.1 Crew Workstation
The D&C system is comprised of a number of configurable components collectively referred to
as the crew workstation. The high level composition of a crew workstation is shown in Figure 3-13.
The primary components are the workstation manager, the workstation controllers, and keypad.
The workstation manager is a CAS display system comprised of a display management computer
and a display unit. The workstation manager is described in the following section. The workstation
controllers and keypad are types of input controllers which are described below.
The crew workstation components connections and interfaces are shown in Figure 3-14. The
workstation manager is primarily comprised of a display management computer and a display unit.
The display computer is one of the classes of operations computers. It is connected to the TT-
GbE network and also has an interface for direct video input for display. The display can receive
compressed imagery via the TT-GbE network compressed in H.264 format. Compressed video is
locally decompressed and displayed to the user. The data and imagery received from the network
and video input are integrated and rendered to the display according to the layout specified by the
user or source data. The current assumption for the interface between the display manager and
the display unit is HDMI. The workstation manager communicates with input controllers (rhc,
thc, and kp in the figure) via a local serial bus, like that used by the BIU to communicate with
subordinate sensors and actuators.
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Figure 3-14. Connectivity in the crew workstation.
Workstation Manager The workstation manager is based on the CAS display system and is
comprised of three assemblies: the display management computer, the display unit, and a power
supply (shown in Figure 3-15). The display management computer is an intelligent network device
capable of receiving commands from a control computer, decoding video streams, metadata overlay
on displays, and generating the display which is then sent to the display unit for viewing. This con-
figuration has several benefits including decoupling the display unit from the display management
computer simplifying maintenance and upgrade activities. This also reduces network traffic by only
transporting data across the network which is then processed by the display computer to generate
the display at the workstation. This functionality is realized using an operations computer as the
display management computer and integrating some of the functionality from a VPU for CODEC
processing at the workstation.
The display unit is connected to the display manager via a dedicated bus (assumed to be HDMI
or something similar). It is a “simple” device for display of text and imagery to the user. The
technology is currently advancing at a rapid pace, but is currently expected to be similar to or
better than Organic Light Emitting Diode (OLED) technology.
Input Controllers There are a number on input controllers available to the user at the crew
workstations. Cursor control is provided by devices such as a mouse, trackpoint, miniature joy-
stick, or touch pad; although, not all of them are amenable to gloved-hand operation. An alpha-
numeric keypad is provided for crew input. The crew workstations provide soft keys that are both
programmable and mode specific to simplify operations. Also, hand controllers, similar to flight
vehicle hand controllers, provide rotational and translational input commands to operate systems,
vehicles, and manipulators. Due to the variance in usability of input controllers between pressurized
and unpressurized environments, multiple options are available to maximize crew efficiency. Some
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Table 3-3. Property estimates for the utility panels.
Mass Power Estimate
Assembly Estimate (Nominal / Max)
Crew Utility Panel 4 kg 12.5 W / 22 W
Airlock Utility Panel 3 kg 4.5 W / 9 W
options, however, are mode dependent and may not be available in all operational environments.
For example, a standard keypad may be comfortable in a pressurized environment, but not effective
for a suited/gloved operator. Each of the input control devices is connected via a local serial bus.
3.4.2 Utility Panels
The habitable elements (habitation elements and large rovers) have utility panels to support
crew operations. The current reference designs account for two classes of utility panels: the crew
utility panel and the airlock utility panel. Both include common low power processors and hardline
network interfaces. The two are differentiated by additional functions described in the following
paragraphs. Estimates for the mass and power of the utility panels are listed in Table 3-3.
Crew Utility Panel The Crew Utility Panel (CUP) provides auxiliary services to simplify crew
communications and operations. A CUP is intended to be installed in each habitable volume as it
provides caution and warning alerts and tones for crew safety. The CUP provides system status via
a display panel, but does not provide command functions beyond querying systems status; the crew
would utilize a crew workstation for command and control. The CUP supports audio functions
including a speaker, microphone, and wireless receiver for wireless headsets. Conceptually, the
CUP could be a portable tablet with a mounting interface at a fixed location for hardline access
to the element’s network and recharging CUP batteries. The CUP provides network access via
hardline network interfaces for portable devices (like USB or Ethernet) as well as wireless network
connectivity as a wireless access point for access to the local area network. The CUP is intended
to operate in a pressurized environment, but in a contingency will provide critical functions when
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Figure 3-16. Composition of the Crew Utility Panel.
operated in a vacuum (for example, when an LER is depressurized to retrieve an injured crew
member). The main components of the CUP are shown in Figure 3-16 while Figure 3-17 depicts
the CUP interfaces.
Airlock Utility Panel The Airlock Utility Panel (AUP) was conceptualized to support opera-
tions by crew preparing for, or returning from, EVA operations. The AUP is simplified version of
the CUP including functions to support: habitat health monitor and display screen, EVA checkout
antenna (S-Band), integrated caution and warning, and suit umbilical port. The AUP provides
health monitoring and status to the crew via a status panel with display and indicators as well as
limited capability for commanding element subsystems. To support EVA operations, the AUP is
integrated with the EVA interface panel which provides recharge and monitoring functions for the
suit. The AUP has an EVA checkout antenna for communication tests prior to umbilical separation
and egress and it also provides network connectivity for voice and telemetry between the EVA suit
and the element. The AUP is designed for vacuum operation and does not require a cold-plate
(active cooling), but does require a conduction path for heat rejection.
4 Major Elements
The previous sections present the basic concepts and functions in this reference architecture.
In this section, these various architectural components and subsystems are aggregated to realize
reference designs for a few of the major LSS elements. The elements presented are categorized
as support, habitation, and mobility systems. The assortment of elements is not comprehensive,
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but does support discussion, illustrating the application of this reference avionics architecture to
various elements.
4.1 Support Systems
The first class of major elements included in the discussion in this report is support systems.
Support systems provide resources to primary systems like the habitation elements, mobility sys-
tems, and communications elements. The following sections describe the reference designs for the
Portable Utility Pallet (PUP) and the PSU. Both the PUP and PSU are used to manage the
storage of consumable resources, specifically power, oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, and water. As the
name implies, the PUP is portable while the PSU is used to transport large payloads and support
larger element operations such as a habitation module. When deployed, a habitation element would
be permanently attached to a PSU.
A primary function of the support systems is to provide power. This functionality is managed
by a collection of systems and assemblies referred to as the support systems Power Management
Complex (PMC). This is shown in the block diagram in Figure 4-1. The PMC is comprised
of a controller, power switching and distribution units, power converters, batteries and charge
controllers, and a BIU. The connectivity of the PMC is shown in the IBD in Figure 4-2. The
PMC is intended to be used as a dual redundant system using cross-strap connections to recover
from failed components. Main power (assumed to be either unregulated solar array output or
high voltage in the range of 300V to 400V) is received by the DC-to-DC Converter Unit (DDCU)
and regulated to 120V for distribution by the PDU. Power is routed from the PDU to the power
switching units for load switching. Two PMCs are cross-strapped at the PDU interface where the
output of one DDCU is routed to the inputs of PDUs in both PMCs using the cross-strap interfaces
(pxtrap out and pxtrap in Figure 4-2). Control of the PMC is managed by the controller and the
BIU. Commands are received from vehicle/element level command and control via the TT-GbE
network at the BIU. Command messages are routed to the controller for processing. The controller
is integrated into the BIU to reduce mass and simplify integration. Also, the controller is expected
to be either a class 1 or class 2 operations computer depending on what other functions (software)
are allocated to it. Local control applications run on the controller issuing commands through the
BIU to the various subassemblies. BIU communicates with power units (distribution, switching,
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Figure 4-1. Power management complex for the support systems.
etc.) via a lower data-rate serial bus such as EIA-422 or SpaceWire. The BIU also hosts sensor
and actuator interfaces such as those for thermocouples, heaters, and relay controls.
4.1.1 Power and Support Unit
The PSU combines a Structural Support Unit (SSU), used to secure and support cargo, with
solar power generation, an energy storage system, a communications package, logistics storage,
and resource scavenging and transfer equipment. The SSU provides the interface to the lander
for habitation and pressurized logistics elements, pressurized rovers, and other cargo and payloads
delivered to the lunar surface. PSUs provide the capability to sustain habitats, provide keep-alive
power to surface systems and landers, provide consolidated storage of consumables, and facilitate
resource scavenging from landers. The PSU can be comprised of either a battery-based or a
Regenerative Fuel-Cell (RFC) based energy storage system. The structural unit is designed to
work with the ATHLETE heavy-lift mobility system to facilitate cargo oﬄoading and handling
operations. The PSU supports several possible configurations for various elements, multiple power
storage elements such as batteries and RFCs, and other storage units such as cryogenic tanks. This
section describes one possible configuration of the PSU which includes RFCs. Figure 4-3 depicts
the current PSU concept with an SSU, several tanks, and an avionics bay.
The composition of the PSU is shown in the BDD in Figure 4-4. The first component is
the SSU which provides structure for the element. The PSU can support both solar arrays and
RFCs. For solar array configurations, the PSU has a solar array interface and Solar Array Drive
Electronics (SADE). The SADE is a special class of BIU specific to solar array control and opera-
tion. The PSU provides recharge function for swappable batteries used by portable elements such
as the Crew Mobility Chassis (CMC). The PSU includes redundant power management complex
to provide power to PSU subsystems, battery recharge, and mated cargo. The charging interface
is a bidirectional interface to transfer power and consumables between the PSU and other ele-
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Figure 4-3. Power and Support Unit configured for a habitation element.
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Figure 4-4. Major subsystems and assemblies in the Power and Support Unit.
ments. The final element shown is the power converter which supports options where there is a
shared power supply for multiple elements (i.e. an outpost power generation element). The PSU
power converter converts high-voltage, and possibly AC, power to the voltage needed by the power
management complex.
The internal connectivity of the PSU is shown in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6. The configura-
tion shown has solar array input with power routed through the SADE to the redundant PMCs.
PMCs provide primary control for the PSU including command and control interactions with other
elements (including mated payloads). The PMCs provide for battery charging and the batteries
can also provide emergency power during solar eclipse and RFC failures. Communications with
other elements are received through redundant TT-GbE interfaces to the PMC BIU and controller.
Local communications from the PMC controller are sent via the PMC BIU over a local serial data
bus as described previously. The PSU BIU includes an integrated network switch and also pro-
vides for monitoring and control of tanks, valves, and pumps. The PSU does not provide network
routing functions and does not incorporate an Element Communication System (ECS). If either of
these is required, the router can be integrated into the BIUand the ECS connected to a TT-GbE
port on the BIU network switch. Figure 4-6 depicts the connectivity of the PSU BIU and tank
management assemblies. The BIU includes the network switch connecting the network in the PSU
to cargo or communications systems via the redundant TT-GbE ports. The processor in the BIU
runs applications for managing PSU resources (such as cryogenic tanks) and also manages PSU
functions such as command processing and health monitoring. Future reliability assessment will
determine the appropriate redundancy for the BIU and its subassemblies.
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Figure 4-5. Connections in the Power and Support Unit.
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Figure 4-6. Interfaces for tank management in the Power and Support Unit.
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4.1.2 Portable Utility Pallet
Figure 4-7. Portable Utility
Pallet.
The PUP is a support system responsible for power generation
and storage. It is also intended to enable various lunar surface
excursions away from the outpost by supplementing operations and
logistics. The PUP is designed to be carried by a mobility system
and delivered to a remote location on the lunar surface without
crew intervention. The PUP is designed to store and supply O2,
water, and power to pressurized rovers, habitats, and other water
storage tanks. Figure 4-7 illustrates a current concept for the PUP.
Figure 4-8 is a BDD illustrating the basic configuration of the
PUP including solar arrays with control electronics, several discrete
interfaces, a redundant power management complex, and removable
batteries. The PUP also includes interfaces for communications us-
ing an ECS, charging, and element interface for integration as a
payload. As described above, the PUP is intended to store O2 and
water using cryogenic tanks. The data network for the configura-
tion shown in Figure 4-8 is depicted in the IBD in Figure 4-9. The
primary data interfaces are the element interface and the ECS in-
terface and data is transferred to the PUP BIU. The PUP BIU
is responsible for the operations of the PUP and PUP subsystems.
Commands received by the PUP are processed and relayed as neces-
sary to the SADE and the PUP power management complex. The
IBD in Figure 4-10 depicts the complete data and power distribu-
tion in the PUP including control interfaces between the PUP BIU
and the cryogenic tanks.
Portable Utility Pallet Portable Utility Pallet[Block] bdd [   ]
«block»
«Physical»
Portable Utility Pallet
«block»
Bus Interface Unit
«block»
Support System 
Power Management 
Complex
«block»
Charging Interface
«block»
«Physical»
Swappable Battery
«block»
Cryogenic Tanks
«block»
Element Interface
«block»
PUP BIU
«block»
ECS Interface
«block»
«Physical»
Solar Array
«block»
PUP PMC
«block»
PUP Array
«block»
«Physical»
Battery
«block»
PUP SADE
«block»
SADE
ct
*
ei
biu
pmc_bci
pmc_a
ecs
0..*
sb0..1
paps
Figure 4-8. Configuration of the Portable Utility Pallet.
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Figure 4-9. IBD for the Portable Utility Pallet data network.
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Figure 4-10. IBD for the Portable Utility Pallet.
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Figure 4-11. Hierarchy of habitation systems.
4.2 Habitation Systems
The habitation systems comprise a family of surface elements that provide a pressurized environ-
ment for the crew members to live and work in while performing mission tasks on the lunar surface.
There are a number of architecture-level requirements that must be met by the habitat elements:
reduce risk, reduce cost, achieve a basic level of crewed lunar surface stays as early as possible,
and support outpost operations with a core habitat element while meeting the initial habitation
functionality and volume goals. Outpost operations consist of Crew Operations, EVA Operations,
Mission Operations, Science Operations, and Logistics & Supportability Operations [Kennedy et al.,
2010]. Figure 4-11 is a BDD depicting the basic composition of a general habitation element as
well as several specialized habitation elements. The pressurized logistics module, the PCM, and
the Portable Excursion Module (PEM) are each types of habitation elements. The logistics module
is used to store food, equipment, spare components, and many other resources required for long
duration exploration of the lunar surface. The PCM provides primary living and working quarters
for the crew and is further described in the following section. The PCM is outfitted with work-
stations for crew mission planning, communications, and remote operation of surface assets. The
PCM also provides for non-mission activities including exercise, personal activities, meals, and rest.
The excursion module is outfitted for science and exploration at remote locations away from an es-
tablished outpost. As such, it is minimally configured for mission operation with workstations and
equipment dedicated to science tasks. Primary mission planning and operations are managed in
the LER the crew travels in. See the paper by Kennedy et al. [2010] for a more detailed description
of the habitation elements.
Each habitation element is comprised of a pressurized module, a PSU, and a CSA. The interfaces
and connections between these three primary components are shown in Figure 4-12. Power is
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Habitation Element Habitation Element[Block] ibd [   ]
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Figure 4-12. Primary modules of the generic habitation element.
received by the PSU, either from a solar array or some other power element, and distributed to the
pressurized module and the CSA. Communications are received via an ECS (not shown) connected
to the CSA or through the GbE interface on the pressurized module. The power outputs from the
pressurized module are connected to subsystems integrated with the pressurized module and can
be either internal or external to the pressure vessel. The following sections describe the reference
design for the pressurized module and PCM, respectively.
4.2.1 Pressurized Module
The Pressurized Module (PM) is the basic component of a habitation element providing the
pressurized environment for the crew to perform mission task objectives. As noted above, pres-
surized modules are used to implement several classes of surface elements including the logistics,
core, and excursion modules. The basic PM is outfitted with redundant power subsystems, primary
data systems complex, thermal control, and multiple hatches for ingress and egress. The power
subsystem is modeled after the power management complex described in Section 4.1. The power
subsystem in the PM provides only minimal power storage for emergency operations. The hatches
provide interfaces for crew ingress and egress as well as to mate with other surface elements. For
example, two PM can be mated to increase the habitable volume and an LER can mate with a
PM allowing crew transfer without having to don EVA suits. The data systems complex in the
PM provides for core data functions common to each of the pressurized elements. This includes
crew utility panels, network switches, a backup computer, video processing, and cameras. The
backup computer provides safety monitoring and can manage PM subsystems during quiescent and
off-nominal operations. Other subsystems that would be included in a habitation element include
ECLS and crew systems and have a greater dependence on the configuration and purpose of the
habitation element. Figure 4-13 shows the composition of the pressurized module.
The primary data interface between the subsystems in the pressurized module is the TT-GbE
network. The internal connectivity of the pressurized module is shown in Figure 4-14. The external
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Figure 4-13. Composition of the basic pressurized module.
interfaces are through the hatches and the two network interfaces that route to the network switches
in the data systems complex. The latter two network interfaces (lan a and lan b at the left in
Figure 4-14) connect to the CSA as shown in Figure 4-12. Command and control is routed through
the data systems complex which performs monitoring and distribution functions for commanding
and health and status of PM subsystems. The data systems complex also includes video processing
assets for internal cameras; these are not shown.
Figure 4-15 depicts a simplified IBD of the data systems complex. The switches route data be-
tween systems internal and external to the data systems complex. Command and critical telemetry
is directed to the backup computer (mfbc) for systems monitoring and control. The crew utility
panels provide crew interfaces for local communications (audio), caution and warning, systems sta-
tus, and network access for wireless systems. The VPU encodes motion imagery and sends it over
the local network to crew workstations, data storage, or communications systems for delivery to
earth-based ground systems. Out-bound data traffic is sent to the C3I routers in the CSA to be
routed to destinations outside the data systems complex.
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Figure 4-14. IBD for a generic pressurized module.
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Figure 4-15. Habitation element C&DH architecture.
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Figure 4-16. Image of the PCM habitation element.
4.2.2 Pressurized Core Module
Once delivered to the lunar surface, the PCM is the primary living and working quarters for
the crew during exploration missions to the lunar outpost. An image of the current concept for
the PCM is shown in Figure 4-16. In the image, a solar array is stowed top of the PCM during
transport to, and across, the lunar surface. Beneath the stowed solar array, there is a radiator to
reject heat from the PCM and its active subsystems. The radiator is attached to the top of the
pressure module. Two hatches are shown in the figure which allow for mating to other elements
and crew ingress and egress in emergency conditions. The pressure module is integrated with the
PSU beneath it.
The PCM includes all of the functions and subsystems of the habitation element, including those
of the pressurized module, plus the additional subsystems shown in Figure 4-17. The additional
subsystems account for environmental control, communications, crew workstations, and at least one
network server for file storage and network applications. The internal network connectivity between
subsystems is shown in Figure 4-18. At the left, element interfaces are attached through the hatches
to the network switches in the data systems complex. Data and command are then routed to a
local subsystem or more likely to the C3I router in the CSA. The CSA is integrated into the
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Figure 4-17. Pressurized core module configuration.
PSU external to the PCM. The CSA provides the primary computing and communications for the
integrated PCM. The ECS provides RF communications over the SWN. All ECS communications
are routed through the CSA. The final subsystem shown in Figure 4-18 is the PCM workstation
for mission operations . The workstation is connected to the GbE network in the PM and displays
video received from over the network or directly from the VPU.
ECLS is briefly described here to illustrate the integration of more complex subsystems. ECLS
is responsible for environmental control and life support functions including atmospheric pressure
control, air revitalization (cleaning and monitoring), water management, fire suppression, and waste
management. The diagram in Figure 4-19 shows the ECLS subsystems with interfaces to the net-
work and computing systems in the pressurized module and the CSA. The ECLS subsystem is
connected to the data systems and CSA via the local GbE network. The BIUs in the ECLS subsys-
tem perform command validation and local control. Although shown separately, later optimization
may integrate these functions with BIUs that support other functions as well. Primary control
applications for element-level ECLS operations are executed in the computing systems in the CSA.
Low-level control applications are executed in the local BIUs managing engineering unit conversion
and tight control loops where necessary. For example, the control application in the CSA does not
require calibration data for the analog signal conditioning or data acquisition performed by the
pressure control system. Figure 4-20 provides further detail for the water management subsystem
of ECLS. The WM BIU receives and generates commands that are translated to discrete commands
sent over a local serial bus or as power to a water management component. In this case, the serial
bus is routed to the level sensor in the water storage tank, waste water recovery system, and the
waste water recovery storage tank.
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Figure 4-18. Command and control systems in the pressurized core module.
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Figure 4-19. Pressurized Core Module (PCM) ECLS subsystems.
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Figure 4-20. Water management subsystem.
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Figure 4-21. Primary mobility systems in the Lunar Surface Systems architecture.
4.3 Mobility Systems
The mobility systems (Chariot, LER, and ATHLETE for example) utilize the same architectural
concepts and patterns as those described above. For discussion purposes, the following sections fo-
cus on systems derived from the CMC, but similar arguments are readily made with the ATHLETE.
In either case, the mobility systems provide mobility to payloads and receive some level of command
and control from external sources. These commands are processed by computing resources in a
CSA where local control commands are generated and distributed over the CMC Onboard Data
Network (ODN). This architecture utilizes the same primary components described in the previous
sections in a smaller scale network. The primary mobility systems are shown in Figure 4-21. The
Constellation Unpressurized Rover (CUR) is a small rover similar to those used during the Apollo
missions. The Chariot is a configuration of the CMC with the Chassis Driving Kit (CDK). The
Chariot also provides unpressurized mobility for the EVA crew. The Lunar Electric Rover (LER)
includes a Pressurized Crew Cabin (PCC) integrated onto a CMC for a mobile, pressurized environ-
ment for the crew during lunar surface exploration. The ATHLETE is a heavy-lift vehicle enabling
the transportation of large assets such as habitation systems, communication terminals, and possi-
bly even landers. The ATHLETE is comprised of two three-legged tri-ATHLETEs that mate with
a PSU to carry cargo. The following sections illustrate the application of the architectural concepts
as applied to the CMC, Chariot, and LER.
4.3.1 Crew Mobility Chassis
The CMC is a six-wheeled vehicle able to function as an unpressurized or pressurized rover or
without any crew at all [Harrison et al., 2008; Bluethmann et al., 2010]. Various payloads and
tools can be attached for conducting science, exploration, or outpost construction tasks. In its
basic configuration, the CMC can be remotely operated to carry unpressurized cargo. A CDK can
be added to allow a suited EVA crew member to ride on and command the rover while carrying
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unpressurized cargo. A PCC can be attached to the CMC to form an LER providing a pressurized
environment for “shirtsleeve” crew members to ride inside, donning suits to egress the habitable
volume and conduct EVAs. The CMC can automatically dock with a charging station (such as
the PUP) allowing it to recharge its internal batteries. It can also carry fuel cells or additional
batteries for extended range excursions. The CMC is comprised of several subsystems to support
vehicle operations and autonomy. The primary computing is provided by a CSA integrated into the
CMC chassis. A redundant power management complex provides power storage, conditioning, and
distribution to CMC subsystems and payloads. Several driving cameras provide for autonomous
relative navigation, surface video and inspection, and video for an operator. An ECS provides
communication over wireless network to local lunar surface assets via the surface wireless network,
via communications resources in lunar orbit, or direct-with-earth communications. The CMC has
six wheel assemblies with active suspension and wheel motor controllers which function similar to
BIUs. The six wheel controllers are responsible for controlling the velocity of the vehicle as well as
control of the active suspension. This local control implements a high-rate control loop (inner loop)
which is managed by the vehicle lower rate control loop (outer loop). Navigation is supported by
star trackers and Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) as well as RF transponders and cameras for
terrain relative navigation. Removable batteries can be interchanged with a PUP for charging and
additional power converters provide high-voltage power to the wheel assemblies. For use in crew-
critical operations, the controller (an operations computer) in the power management complex can
serve as a backup computer if required. However, it is expected that the CMC is usually configured
with a payload such as the CDK or PCC, both of which have onboard processing sufficient for
backup computer and safety monitoring functions. The aggregation of the components used to
realize a CMC is shown in the BDD Figure 4-22.
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Figure 4-22. Composition of the crew mobility chassis.
The internal connectivity of the primary components of the CMC is shown in Figure 4-23. Two
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power interfaces are connected to the power management complexes for charging the CMC power
storage. GbE interfaces are routed to the CSA for C&DH and command and control processing.
Access to available wireless networks is provided by the ECS which routes communications to the
C3I router in the CSA. The star tracker and IMU are shown connected to the serial bus from the
BIUs in the PMCs, but they could also be connected via the local GbE network. Video from the
driving cameras is sent to the VPU in the CSA for processing and encoding. Finally, the power
converters are powered by the PMCs and provide high-voltage to the wheel assemblies. Control of
the CMC power converters is provided by switching the load in the PMC.
4.3.2 Chariot
The Chariot configuration is comprised of a CMC and a CDK that hosts the control interface
(display, input panel, and hand controls) and suit interfaces [Harrison et al., 2008]. A recent concept
for the Chariot is shown in Figure 4-24. The image depicts an unmanned Chariot able to transport
four crew members, two at control turrets and two on a rear platform. The Chariot can also carry
payload (such as the PUP or science samples) on the rear platform. Figure 4-25 shows an IBD
for the Chariot configuration illustrating data interfaces. The CDK augments the functions of the
CMC by providing command and control interfaces for onboard crew with the CDK control station.
The CDK control station is a class of crew workstation (see Section 3.4.1) configured specifically
for operation by suited crew in a vacuum environment. Commands and data are transferred over
the GbE interfaces and video can be displayed for the crew either real-time from the VPU over the
HDMI interface or encoded over the GbE network.
4.3.3 Lunar Electric Rover
The LER provides a mobile, pressurized environment for the crew to perform exploration,
mission, and science tasks. The LER is comprised of a PCC integrated onto a CMC (refer to
Figure 4-21). The interfaces of the LER are shown in Figure 4-26. As described above, the CMC
has a SWN interface and charging interfaces. Between the CMC and PCC, power is supplied to
the PCC and there is a bi-directional GbE interface for data, command, and control transmission.
Not shown are the interfaces for mating to other pressurized modules such as the PCM. The PCC
has two hatches with the interfaces described for the pressurized module in Section 4.2.1.
The PCC is a pressurized module designed with a smaller volume for mobile applications.
Some of main subsystems in the PCC are shown in the BDD in Figure 4-27. The PCC includes
power distribution and a data systems complex as described in Section 4.2.1. The PCC has two
workstations for controlling the LER (as well as other remote surface assets) and performing mission
tasks. It also provides ECLS to sustain the crew. The thermal control subsystem (not shown)
incorporates active and passive techniques for thermal management [Stephan, 2010]. The internal
connections for these systems are shown in the IBD in Figure 4-28.
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Figure 4-23. IBD for the CMC.
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Figure 4-24. Chariot configuration with Crew Mobility Chassis (CMC) and Chassis Driving Kit
(CDK).
[Block] Chariot Chariotibd [   ]
swn : SWN_fs
vpu : VPU [0..*]
vout : HDMI_fs
csa : CMC CSA
csa-ecs
csa-lan_a : GbE
csa-lan_b : GbE
ecs : CMC ECS
ecs_swn : SWN_fs
cmc-ecs
cmc : Crew Mobility Chassis
cmc-gbe_a : GbE
cmc-gbe_b : GbE
ecs_swn : SWN_fs
vout : HDMI_fs
cs : CDK Control 
Station [1..*]
lan_a : GbE
lan_b : GbE
vin : ~HDMI_fs
cdk : Chassis Driving Kit
Figure 4-25. IBD for the Chariot configuration.
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Lunar Electric Rover Lunar Electric Rover[Block] ibd [   ]
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Figure 4-26. IBD for the Lunar Electric Rover (LER).
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Figure 4-27. Composition of the Pressurized Crew Cabin (PCC).
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Figure 4-28. IBD for the Pressurized Crew Cabin (PCC).
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5 Summary
This report describes the current concepts for the reference avionics architecture used in Lunar
Surface Systems (LSS) elements. The progression of the discussion starts in Section 2 with a
brief overview of the surface elements that rely on the avionics and data systems described in
this report. Section 3 describes assemblies and functions that are collected to develop subsystems
used in multiple surface elements. These establish patterns of reuse and integration that are then
aggregated to develop reference architectures for complete elements and vehicles. The integrated
reference designs for several major elements are described in Section 4. Among these are the
Power and Support Unit (PSU) followed by descriptions of the Pressurized Core Module (PCM)
as a representative habitation element and the Chariot configuration of the Crew Mobility Chassis
(CMC). The description of the element reference designs serves to both detail the vehicle design as
well as illustrate the use of subsystems repeated in architectural patterns. For example, the support
system power management complex described in the introduction of Section 4.1 is reused in the
PSU, Portable Utility Pallet (PUP), habitation elements, and mobility systems. Also, the general
reference architecture incorporates both string-level redundancy as well as dissimilar redundancy
as part of initial considerations for common cause failure mitigation.
5.1 Alternate Destinations
Recent governmental and programmatic activities have altered the primary objectives of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
related to manned spaceflight. The concepts presented here reflect systems associated with lunar
surface deployment. The concepts and assumptions are grossly applicable to many space desti-
nations as the avionics architecture conceived of to date is intended to be flexible and evolvable.
There are, however, a number of assumptions that would have to be revisited. Among these are
assumptions about timing for critical operations and phases of operations, the interoperability of
components and systems, and maintenance considerations. In-flight vehicles have dynamic intervals
different from those experienced by mobile and stationary surface assets. The radiation environ-
ment, although not addressed in this report, has driven many of the decisions related to reliability,
redundancy, and fault-management. Some vehicles and the quantity of various elements are the
result of targeting exploration on the lunar surface. The exploration of many in-space destinations
will likely not require wheeled vehicles nor will they merit the interoperation of a large collection of
nearby assets. This potentially increases the need for autonomy in the various elements. Finally, a
major objective in developing the described lunar reference avionics architecture was to assess and
establish commonality across the various elements. The collection of relevant elements is dependent
on the destination which in turn affects the various parameters and amount of commonality across
the architecture. The overall architecture will probably still be applicable; however, subtle details
of implementation and subsystem partitions will likely shift.
5.2 Future Work
The architectural concepts presented in this report are neither exhaustive nor complete. The
intent is to both capture the concepts that have developed so far and establish a basis for fu-
ture analysis. In the continued development of manned space exploration, there are a number of
objectives that are immediately evident that can benefit and build upon this work. Current pro-
grammatic changes are evaluating destinations other than the lunar surface. The first task is to
revise the architecture to account for new mission objectives and reference missions. A second task
44
is to assess mission safety to develop reliability metrics to evaluate and mature architecture. This is
similar to, and would extend, the work described by Borer et al. [2010]. The third task is to develop
standards for interoperability including form-factor, power, communications, and software. These
are required to efficiently realize the interoperability described in this report. The fourth immedi-
ate task is to mature the design relative to instrumentation and subsystem integration. There are
significant opportunities for subsystem integration that will reduce system mass and power. Also,
detailed instrumentation planning and designs are incomplete and will affect subsystem partitioning
and integration.
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